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I. INTRODUCTION 
"Michigan has completed a monumental task in its formulation and adoption 
of these procedural laws. They encompass the most enlightened views of 
modem procedural practice. Michigan proudly points to its achievement as a 
milestone in modem procedural reform."l 
THE new Michigan procedural laws are embodied in a revised set of statutes and court rules which became effective January 
I, 1963, after a long period of study by a Joint Committee on 
Michigan Procedural Revision.2 They abolish an anachronistic 
distinction between procedures in law and equity, abrogate a 
scattered, disorganized set of rules and statutes, and create a 
unified, coherent procedural system. 
As a part of this system, the Michigan Supreme Court has 
promulgated new General Court Rules similar to most of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 In this revision Michigan has 
adopted some significant changes in the federal rules and some sup-
plementary statutes of unusual interest. It has also retained some 
important prior Michigan procedures. These deviations from and 
changes in the federal rules will be reviewed for the purpose of 
ascertaining whether they are desirable for use in states which 
have adopted or are contemplating the adoption of the federal 
rules system. For this purpose, discussions of the advantages and 
disadvantages of state adoption of the federal rules system will not 
be rehashed. Rather, it is assumed in this article that the federal 
rules system is generally desirable for use by the states.4 At the 
• Professor of Law, University of Washington.-Ed. 
l Honigman, Procedural Changes in Michigan, 31 F.R.D. 113, 119 (1962). 
2 Professor Charles W. Joiner of the University of Michigan was chairman of the 
committee, and Mr. Jason L. Honigman, of the Detroit bar, was vice-chairman. 
s The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are hereinafter referred to as the federal 
rules. The new Michigan General Court Rules are hereinafter referred to as the Michigan 
rules. 
4 Some nineteen states have adopted the entire federal rules system. The status of 
the movement to adopt the federal rules in state jurisdictions is reviewed in Wright, 
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same time, it is assumed that consideration should be given to the 
possibility of making particular revisions for state use. 
One important consideration in judging state revisions of the 
federal rules system is not discussed elsewhere in this article and 
is not relied upon to support specific conclusions concerning the 
Michigan changes. When a new procedural system is proposed in 
a state jurisdiction and the federal rules system is used as a general 
model, it is desirable to promote the ideal of uniformity in state 
and federal practice by adoption of each federal rule without 
major changes even though innovations or changes to preserve 
prior practice might result in some improvements. Ordinarily, 
it seems best to make changes only if they seem to offer very 
appreciable advantages. 
Complete coverage of all Michigan revisions of the federal 
rules could be only cursory. Consequently, attention will be 
focused on the rules which are effective prior to trial, and, even 
so, only the most important revisions of the federal rules in this 
area can be discussed.5 
II. COMMENCEMENT OF SUIT, SERVICE OF PROCESS, 
AND JURISDICTION 
Since Federal Rule 4 is designed to deal with problems of 
service of process that arise from the organization of the federal 
court system and the jurisdictional requirements for suit in federal 
Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85 (1959). For criticism of the newly revised 
New York rules system, which does not follow the federal rules system, see Clark, Two 
Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 435, 447-51 (1958). 
5 The Michigan rules and statutes are analyzed in detail for Michigan lawyers in 
two sources. JOINT COMMITrEE ON MICHIGAN PROCEDURAL REVISION, FINAL REPORT pts. 
I-III (1960) (Part III of this report is hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT); 1 HoNIGMAN &: 
HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT Rut.ES ANNOTATED (1962) (hereinafter cited as HONIGMAN &: 
HAWKINS). A preliminary repon of the joint committee is also helpful. Joint Committee 
on Michigan Procedural Revision, Michigan Procedural Revision: A Partial Set of Rules, 
Mich. S.B.J., Jan. 1959, p. 7. Several articles and comments furnish backgxound for 
certain of the new Michigan rules. Blume, The Scope of a Cause of Action-Elimination 
of the Splitting Trap, Mich. S.B.J., Dec. 1959, p. 10; Joiner &: Miller, Rules of Practice 
and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REv. 624 (1957); Joiner 
&: Geddes, The Union of Law and Equity, 55 MICH. L. REv. 1059 (1957); Miller, Splitting 
a Cause of Action Under the New Michigan Court Rules: Alternative Interpretations, 8 
WAYNE L. R.Ev. 497 (1962); Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pts. 1-2), 
55 MrcH. L. REv. 327, 483 (1957); Comment, Preliminary Motion Practice Under the 
Michigan General Court Rules of 1963, 8 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 399 (1962); Comment, Pre-Trial 
Deposition and Discovery Under the Michigan General Court Rules of 1963, 8 WAYNE 
L. REv. 417 (1962); Comment, Joinder of Parties and Claims Under the Michigan General 
Court Rules of 1963, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 512 (1963); Comment, Venue and Jurisdiction 
Under the Revised Judicature Act and General Court Rules of 1963, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 
527 (1962); Comment, Pleading Under the Michigan General Court Rules of 1963, 8 
WAYNE L. R.Ev. 542 (1962). 
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district courts, most of the states which have adopted the federal 
rules system have been forced to revise the rule. Similarly, rather 
elaborate substituted provisions are included in the Michigan 
rules and statutes. These are important for Michigan practice, 
but they are fairly commonplace or involve innovations of minor 
general importance. However, three matters concerning service 
of process and jurisdiction merit extended consideration. 
A. Out-of-State Service Statute 
Statutory provisions include the substance of an Illinois stat-
ute that provides for obtaining personal jurisdiction by means of 
personal service outside the state on nonresidents who have spe-
cified "contacts" with the state.6 In separate sections relating to 
acts of individuals or their agents, corporations or their agents, 
partnerships or their agents, and partnership associations or un-
incorporated voluntary associations or their agents, the Michigan 
statute specifies that personal jurisdiction may be obtained with 
respect to the transaction of any business within the state, the 
commission of a tortious act or receipt of an injury from such act 
within the state, ownership, possession, or use of property within 
the state, and contracting to insure persons, property or risks in 
the state.7 These sections constitute a desirable elaboration of 
the similar Illinois provision. 8 
In addition to the above-mentioned sections, the Michigan 
statute contains provisions which are not found in the Illin0is 
statute. Contracting for services to be rendered or materials to be 
furnished within the state is a basis for personal jurisdiction of all 
of the types of defendants named above. Also, acting as a director, 
manager, trustee, or officer of any Michigan corporation or any 
foreign corporation whose principal office is located in the state 
is ground for jurisdiction over nonresident individuals.9 A sup-
plementary rule provides for service of summons and complaint 
outside of the state by the methods specified by the rules for ob-
6 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. llO, §§ 16-17 (1961). Similar statutes have been enacted in other 
states: IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 5-514 to -517 (Supp. 1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 
1961); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw & RuLES § 302 (1962); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.28.180-.185 (1961); 
and WIS. STAT. §§ 262.05-.06 (1961). 
7 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.705, .715, .725, .735 (1961). 
s The Illinois statute merely refers to "any person." It does not include the clause 
that receipt of an injury from a tortious act may be the basis of personal jurisdiction, 
but refers only to the commission of a tortious act within the state. ILL. REv. STAT. 
ch. llO, § 17 (1961). The Michigan reference to receipt of injury in the state codifies an 
Illinois decision interpreting the Illinois clause. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
9 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.705. 
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taining personal jurisdiction of persons served within the state.10 
Recent studies of the constitutionality of such statutes and of 
their application in particular instances are found elsewhere,11 
and the constitutional problems presented will not be re-examined 
here. 
A vast array of questions concerning the meaning of the pro-
visions outlining the jurisdictional bases are unanswered. For 
example, what type of interests in property held by a nonresident 
will bring defendants within the provision concerning ownership, 
possession or use of local property? Conceding that a nonresident 
has the requisite interest in local property, what must be the 
relation between his interest and the subject matter of a suit 
brought against him? Obviously, the utility of out-of-state service 
statutes is only presently affected by these and other unsolved 
questions which will ultimately be answered by the courts. 
The Michigan statutory wording which deviates from lan-
guage of the Illinois statute raises similar questions. In a case 
which involves substantial but incidental performance of a con-
tract in Michigan, will the statute preclude a contention that 
there has been a transaction of business in Michigan, under the 
general clause referring to the transaction of any business, be-
cause of the existence of the more specific clause relating to per-
formance of contracts in Michigan-the clause concerning con-
tracts for services to be rendered or materials to be furnished in the 
st'ate?12 Does this latter clause refer to any contract which happens 
to involve the prescribed performance in Michigan, although per-
formance in Michigan is not necessarily intended by the parties? 
What actions of a nonresident officer of a corporation with its 
10 "Service of a summons and a copy of the complaint, as hereinbefore provided, 
shall confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant having any of the contacts, ties, 
or relations with this state as specified in RJA Chapter 7, by giving notice to the 
defendant of the pendency of the action and an opportunity to defend. There is no 
territorial limitation on the range of the service of such notice." MICH. RuLE 105.9. 
Rule 105.2, and RJA (Revised Judicature Act) ch. 19, § 1913, contain a special provi-
sion under which nonresidents may be served by personal service within the state upon 
an agent, employee, representative, salesman, or servant of the nonresident. Process must 
also be mailed by registered mail to the defendant at his last known address. 
11 Cleary &: Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. 
REv. 599 (1955); Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern 
Trends, 5 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 198 (1958); Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local 
Causes of Action, 1956 WIS. L. REv. 522 (1956); O'Connor &: Goff, Expanded Concepts of 
State Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act, 31 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 223 (1955); Comment, 34: ROCKY MT. L. REv. 359 (1962). 
12 The specific clause reads: "Entering into a contract for services to be rendered 
or for materials to be furnished in the state by the defendant." MICH. STAT. ANN 
§§ 27A.705, .715, .725, .735 (1961). 
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principal office in Michigan will subject him to personal juris-
diction? Such problems should not deter plaintiffs from using the 
statute in many situations. The elaborate Michigan provisions out-
lined above seem preferable to the more scanty provisions of the 
Illinois statute. 
None of the general out-of-state service statutes, including 
the Michigan statute, deal adequately with interesting theories 
of interpretation which would extend the scope of the jurisdic-
tional bases of such statutes to divorce suits. Whenever a divorce 
action is brought against a husband who is currently a nonresident 
on grounds which involve acts of a tortious nature which have 
previously been committed within the state, it is possible to take 
the position that the divorce suit involves the commission of a 
tort within the terms of the statutes. Thus, jurisdiction to render 
a valid personal judgment for alimony or support payments could 
be obtained by service on a nonresident husband outside the 
state.13 In Michigan, Rule 723 might also be somewhat pertinent, 
since it provides that in divorce suits plaintiff shall cause process 
to be served in accordance with Rules 105 and 106.14 Rule 105.9 
provides for service outside the state under the jurisdictional 
statute. 
Constitutional arguments against the use of the statutes in 
divorce cases might well be overcome, but important questions of 
statutory interpretation remain. In states in which spouses cannot 
sue each other for torts, it is rather unrealistic to classify any of 
their acts as tortious for the instant purpose. Even if tort actions 
between spouses are permitted, the above suggestion goes beyond 
the language of the statutes, for they seem to encompass only actions 
which have been traditionally labeled "tort" actions. Divorce 
actions in which alimony or support is sought have not been so 
categorized.16 Furthermore, the grounds for divorce actions are 
specified by the legislature, whether or not such grounds are 
tortious. The fact that such grounds may create civil liability 
by virtue of an independent field of law-the law of torts-is im-
material, as a logical matter, to a suit for divorce. Likewise, the 
right to alimony is usually considered statutory; it is not founded 
on tort law. 
13 This theory has been accepted by a Washington trial court. Stem v. Stern, Civil 
No. 569793, King County Super. Ct., Aug. 21, 1961. 
H MICH. RULE 723. 
15 For a succinct history of subject of divorce, see MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS 256-63 (1931). 
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There is a less plausible theory to support the notion that if 
the marriage occurred within the state a resident spouse can ob-
tain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse in a divorce 
case. In this situation it might be argued that the divorce suit 
is an action arising out of a transaction within the state. 
From some viewpoints a marriage involves a contract, but es-
sentially it is a status or relation which is not governed by contract 
law.16 However, even if it is considered a contractual relationship 
or if its creation is accomplished merely by means of a contract, 
a marriage does not appear to be a "transaction" as that word is 
used in the out-of-state service statutes. "Transaction" has usually 
meant a business transaction of some kind.17 The thought that 
the subject matter of a divorce action arises out of the "trans-
action" of marriage also overlooks the fact that divorce may be 
had only on specified grounds, and not merely because there is a 
marriage. 
Thus, the present general out-of-state service statutes do not 
appear to cover divorce suits. However, the need for personal 
jurisdiction for alimony and support orders in suits against non-
resident husbands justifies consideration of appropriate statutory 
provisions to satisfy the need. 
Having first outlined a broad policy that in specified situa-
tions it is fair for Michigan residents to bring suit in Michigan 
courts against nonresidents, the draftsmen of the Michigan stat-
ute in its final form tacked on a provision that deters resort to 
the statute. It states that, upon motion of defendant, plaintiff 
must post a bond in a sum approved by the court. If plaintiff 
does not obtain judgment, "so much of the penalty of said bond 
as may be required shall be applied to the satisfaction of any 
judgment for court costs and to defray the actual expenses of such 
defendant incurred in defending the action (but not to include 
attorney's fees).''18 If plaintiff obtains judgment, the reasonable 
expense of procuring the bond may be taxed as costs to defendant. 
Presumably one purpose of the out-of-state service statute is 
to make suit against nonresidents convenient for Michigan plain-
tiffs. This purpose is nullified to a certain extent by the bond 
provision. In all but the clearest cases plaintiff will run the risk 
of posting bond and the further risk that the penalty of the bond 
16 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
17 See Comment, supra note 11. 
18 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.741 (1961). 
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will be applied to defray defendant's expenses. Thus, it appears 
that a prospective plaintiff will be required to compare in advance 
his probable expenses of suit in Michigan, including expenses 
arising as a result of the bond provision, with his probable ex-
penses if suit is brought elsewhere. It may be difficult to make 
this comparison in many instances. The result may be that cer-
tain claims which are more than colorable will not be instituted 
in Michigan by use of out-of-state service. The bond provision 
may tend to relegate use of the statute to types of cases in which 
there is likely to be a default judgment. Moreover, the bond 
provision is illogical. It does not take into account the fact that 
defendant would have incurred expenses if he had been sued in 
his own state. 
Eventually, many states will probably enact a broad out-of-
state service statute, and there is no assurance that similar condi-
tions will be enacted to protect Jv!ichigan residents and corpora-
tions who are sued under such statutes outside of Michigan.10 
Finally, at the present writing the bond provision does not seem 
to be required to ensure the constitutionality of the statute. Thus, 
it appears desirable to omit such a provision. 
It must be conceded that the bond provision will result in 
more equitable treatment of nonresidents. Since the bond penalty 
operates "in the event judgment is not rendered in favor of the 
plaintiff," it discourages use of the statute in suits which are basi-
cally groundless and are brought only in hope of a settlement. It 
seems more sensible and logical than a provision in the Washing-
ton out-of-state service statute which requires the losing plaintiff 
to pay reasonable attorney fees of defendant's attorney.20 
As mentioned above, when jurisdiction is based on the Mich-
igan statute, service of process may be had in the manner provided 
for service to obtain personal jurisdiction within the state. Al-
though substituted service is narrowly restricted in Michigan, 
this Michigan provision suggests that other states should consider 
enacting, in connection with an out-of-state service statute, a pro-
vision for substituted service at the home of a nonresident indi-
vidual.21 Except for the bond provision the Michigan statute 
(with related rule provisions) is an excellent model.22 
10 The statutes cited in note 6 supra do not include any similar bond provision. 
20 WASH. REv. CODE § 4.28.185 (1961). 
21 Except in Michigan and Wisconsin, only personal service is authorized by out-
of-state service statutes. See statutes cited in note 6 supra. 
22 Appropriate venue and statute of limitations provisions are included in the 
Michigan statutes. MrcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.1601-27, .5853 (1961). The statutes do 
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B. Substituted Service at the Defendant's Abode 
The joint committee which drafted the Michigan rules pro-
posed a rule providing for substituted service upon an individual 
in Michigan by service upon a member of his family of suitable 
age and discretion at his usual place of abode, so long as plaintiff 
authorized such service and also mailed a copy of summons and 
complaint to the usual place of abode.23 New to Michigan, this 
proposal was disapproved by legislative action.24 This rejection 
may have resulted from the fear that the proposed substituted 
service rule could be the subject of abuse, in some instances, even 
though it was more restricted than provisions for substituted serv-
ice in many other states. In spite of such a fear, similar provisions 
have not been subject to criticism in other states. The fact is that 
most attorneys prefer to take the conservative action of attempting 
to obtain personal service before resorting to substituted service. 
The availability of such a mqde of service helps to ensure that 
"process-dodging" tactics will be unsuccessful. 
C. Discretion of Trial Courts To Authorize Any Type 
of Constitutional Service of Process 
Another noteworthy service of process provision is found in 
Rule 105.8. This rule states that a court may in its discretion 
allow service of process to be made upon a defendant in any man-
ner that is reasonably calculated to give defendant actual notice 
of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. An order 
permitting such service must be entered before actual service of 
process. To secure the order, plaintiff must show that service of 
process cannot reasonably be made in the manner outlined in 
other rules.25 The rule was designed to authorize a trial court 
to permit, upon the appropriate showing, any means of service 
which might be constitutional under decided cases.26 It ensures 
not contain a provision dealing with attempts to join other claims with claims which 
are clearly within the statute. The Illinois statute restricts joinder of claims to claims 
arising from acts enumerated by the statute. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. llO, § 17 (1961). 
23 FINAL REPORT 12. 
24 1 HONIGMAN &: HAWKINS 77. Michigan is one of three states without provision for 
substituted service of this type. FINAL REPORT 14. 
25 "The court in which an action has been commenced may, in its discretion, allow 
service of process to be made upon a defendant in any other manner which is reason-
ably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be 
heard, if an order permitting such service is entered before service of process is made 
upon showing to the court that service of process cannot reasonably be made in the 
manner provided for under other rules." MICH. RuLE 105.8. 
26 FINAL REPORT 20. 
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state authorization for constitutional service in addition to statu-
tory service that might prove to be unconstitutional.27 
This purpose of securing utilization of newly approved or 
other constitutional service can be better accomplished by pro-
mulgation of amendments to the rules from time to time. Pro-
mulgation of amendments ensures centralized control of new 
methods of service and provides adequate notification to all at-
torneys in the state. Uniformity of decision is also promoted. 
Finally, to the extent that the instant rule is operative only at 
the trial court level, no statewide policy decision is made. It may 
well be that, as a matter of state policy, not all constitutional 
methods of service should be utilized. 
III. PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS 
A. Order and Arrangement of Content 
Much of the substance of the federal rules concerning plead-
ings and motions has been retained in the new Michigan rules, 
but arrangement of content has been altered substantially. This 
arrangement seems less convenient than the simple order of state-
ment in the federal rules. All of the time limitations for motions 
and pleadings are collected in the rule otherwise analogous to 
Federal Rule 6.28 Counterclaims are treated in the rule governing 
joinder of claims, with the exception of one paragraph inexplica-
bly included in the rule covering general rules of pleading.29 The 
general subject matter of Federal Rules 12 and 56 is included in 
four rules, only three of which are numbered consecutively.30 In 
fact, all of the Michigan rules, including the pleading rules, are 
numbered by a system which does not correspond to the federal 
system.31 
The arrangement and the numbering of the new procedural 
rules which substantially incorporate the federal rules are not in-
consequential matters; the rules should be numbered to encour-
age reference to the analogous federal rules. Such reference must 
be encouraged because many attorneys have only occasional reason 
to use new rules. As a matter of fact, some attorneys with con-
!?7 1 HONIGMAN &: HAWKINS 114. 
!?8 MICH. RULE 108. 
!?O MICH. RuLE 203 governs joinder of claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims. MICH. 
RuLE 111.8 provides that a counterclaim may exceed an opposing claim in amount. 
30 Similar in content to Federal Rules 12 and 56 are Michigan Rules 111 (in part), 
115, 116, and 117 (in part). 
81 For example, the rules similar to Federal Rules 6 through 13 are numbered 
Michigan Rules 107 through 109. 
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siderable trial work may treat new rules with cavalier abandon 
if they read them at all.32 This is possible because former methods 
of practice are available, at least in part, even after the federal 
rules system has been adopted. 
B. Changes in Federal Rules To Preserve Prior Practice 
Fact Pleading. Retention of "fact pleading" in Michigan 
seems to require more specific pleading than is necessary under 
the federal rules. To the extent this conclusion is correct, Mich-
igan Rule 111 is not compatible with the philosophy of the federal 
rules. 
Prior requirements for "fact pleading" of a "cause of action" 
are retained by the provision of Rule 111 which states that a 
pleading "which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain ... 
a statement of the facts without repetition upon which the pleader 
relies in stating his cause of action with such specific averments 
as are necessary reasonably to inform the adverse party of the 
nature of the cause he is called upon to defend .... "33 This 
provision is reinforced by Rule 115, which provides for a motion 
for more definite statement if "a pleading is so vague or ambigu-
ous that it fails to comply with the requirements of the rules."84 
Rule 115 also provides that any part of any pleading may be 
stricken if it is "not drawn in conformity to these rules."35 
Mr. Honigman and Professor Hawkins, two leading commen-
tators on the new Michigan rules, state that, "unless an unintended 
regression from prior practice is to be read into the new rule," 
the clause of Rule 111 concerning specific averments "must be 
taken as modifying that which precedes it-that is, as prescribing 
the purpose or end to which the pleader is required to state a 
32 Mr. Philip S. Van Cise, who was the chief proponent of a system similar to the 
federal rules adopted in Colorado, sent a questionnaire to all judges in Colorado ten 
years after the system patterned on the federal rules became effective in that state. On 
the basis of the resulting data and his own extensive experience, he summarized 
Colorado's ten-year experience as follows: "Have they [the federal rules] improved 
the practice of law; are they of value to litigants; have they shortened the length of 
trials and facilitated compromises? The answer to these four questions is yes-if the 
lawyers and judges really know the Rules and properly apply them in court. The trouble 
is that many of both groups have not really studied the Rules and do not apply them." 
Van Cise, The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 RocKY MT. L. REV. 527, 528 (1951). 
A standard joke in states which have promulgated an entire set of new rules concerns 
the law professor who asked the trial judge how the new rules were operating in his 
county. The judge replied, "Fine. They are causing no problems at all. No one is paying 
any attention to them." 
33 MICH. RULE 111.1. 
34 MICH. RULE 115.1. 
35 MICH. RULE 115.2. 
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'cause of action.' "36 Thus, these commentators conclude that the 
rule emphasizes the notice function of the complaint and expe-
ditious disposition of frivolous or legally hopeless claims.37 It is 
further suggested that prior rules worked "quite well" and that 
it was "not necessary ... to adopt new language and possibly write 
new interpretation and resulting confusion.''38 They also suggest 
that the Michigan Supreme Court has been liberal in these re-
spects, and that "for the most part Michigan practice establishes 
that a complaint cannot be dismissed because its allegations are 
insufficient to cover all the technical elements of a cause of action, 
so long as the facts which might be proved under the pleading 
could qualify the pleader for relief.''39 Finally, it is stated that 
in recent years no appellate decision sanctions the dismissal of a 
complaint for pleading evidentiary facts nor, for the most part, 
has the Supreme Court recently seized upon lack of specificity or 
defective draftsmanship to avoid the merits by the device of label-
ing allegations as insufficient because they were "conclusions."40 
Despite these observations it appears that, at least for the pres-
ent, Michigan has rejected in part the philosophy of the function 
of the complaint which is embodied in Federal Rule S(a).41 The 
distinction between "ultimate facts," "evidential facts" and "con-
clusions" is apparently preserved to some extent. Undoubtedly, 
the Michigan Supreme Court has shown a liberal attitude in in-
terpreting complaints, but even recent cases show retention of 
the concept that proper "fact" allegations must be allegations of 
"ultimate facts" and not allegations of "legal conclusions" nor alle-
gations of "evidential facts."42 It might also be pertinent to observe 
36 1 HoNIGMAN &: HAWKINS 196. 
37 Id. at 196-97. 
38 Id. at 198. 
30 Id. at 197. 
40 Id. at 197-98. 
41 Under Rule 8(a) of the federal rules, technical distinctions between ultimate 
facts, evidentiary facts, and conclusions are abolished. A restricted use of the motion 
for more definite statement is contemplated. Evidential facts should not be stricken 
because they are evidential. See the short explanation and authorities cited in Meisen-
holder, The Effect of Proposed Rules 7 Through 25 on Present Washington Procedures, 
32 WASH. L. R.Ev. 219, 230-32, 261-63 (1957). At the same time, a motion to dismiss 
should be granted -under the federal rules unless it appears certain that no state of 
facts entitling plaintiff to relief could be proved under the statements in the complaint. 
Sec cases collected in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2245-46 n.6 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 
MooRE]. Official forms indicate that statements may be quite general. FED. R. ClV. P. 
App. of Forms. 
42 The Michigan Supreme Court has stated that the court is "committed to the 
notice theory of pleading," and that "no declaration shall be deemed insufficient which 
shall contain such information as shall reasonably inform the defendant of the nature 
of the case he is called upon to defend." Baker v. Gushwa, 354 Mich. 241, 246, 92 
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that, in states requiring a complaint to state facts, it is not uncom-
mon to find trial judges occasionally enforcing these distinctions 
and specificity of pleading more strictly than seems warranted by 
statements in the opinions of the appellate courts of the state. 
On its face, Rule 115.2 authorizes a motion to strike "eviden-
tial facts" because it authorizes the striking of any part of a plead-
ing "not drawn in conformity to these rules." And since by defi-
nition "legal conclusions" are not "ultimate facts," it appears that 
a motion for more definite statement under Rule 115 can be used 
to attack allegations of such conclusions on the simple basis that 
such conclusions have been stated. In fact, it is arguable that the 
motion may be used to force particularized statements of fact in 
accord with the usual practice in most code pleading states. In 
other words, it seems that the motion for a more definite state-
ment may be used to attack allegations of "ultimate facts" in va-
rious instances.43 The joint committee has commented that the 
test for the motion "is based upon whether the adverse party can 
N.W.2d 507, 510 (1958). See also Jean v. Hall, 364 Mich. 434, 111 N.W.2d 111 (1961); 
Manley, Bennett & Co. v. Woodhams, 349 Mich. 586, 84 N.W.2d 771 (1957). 
Nevertheless, the distinctions mentioned in the text have recently furnished problems 
on appeal and are apparently regarded as pertinent at the trial court level. A long 
quotation stating the distinctions is approved in Steed v. Covey, 355 Mich. 504, 94 
N.W.2d 864 (1959). In Roblyer v. Hoyt, 343 Mich. 431, 72 N.W.2d 126 (1955), the court 
held that a complaint for malicious prosecution was insufficient because an allegation 
that defendants acted without probable cause was merely a conclusion of law and there 
were no allegations of fact sufficient to support the conclusion. However, by proper 
reference to facts submitted in support of a motion to dismiss, the court found that 
there was probable cause. It is likely that the general allegation of lack of probable 
cause is sufficient in a complaint under Federal Rule 8(a). See the form located at 1 
BENDER'S FEDERAL PRACTICE FORMS 489 (1963). Such an allegation is quoted with approval 
in Riegel v. Hygrade Seed Co., 47 F. Supp. 290 (W.D.N.Y. 1942), and is conceded to be 
good, for purposes of argument, without deciding the point raised, in Leggett v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 178 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1949). 
In Koebke v. La Buda, 339 Mich. 569, 64 N.W .2d 914 (1954), the court stated that 
allegations that defendant held property in trust for plaintiff and that deceased's minor 
son stood in relationship of loco parentis to a party were insufficient conclusions. In 
more recent cases, part of the opinions are devoted to contentions that certain allega-
tions were statements of conclusions and not facts. See, e.g., Frazier v. Ford Motor Co., 
364 Mich. 648, 112 N.W.2d 80 (1961); Pfaffenberger v. Pavilion Restaurant Co., 352 Mich. 
1, 88 N.W.2d 488 (1958). And the opinion in In re Del Monte's Estate, 340 Mich. 165, 65 
N.W.2d 309 (1954), indicates details which a trial court thought should have been 
pleaded. Its conclusions were reversed on appeal. 
43 "In cases where the bill of particulars is now used to state details, this motion 
[motion for more definite statement] will be in order." FINAL REPORT 49. 
"Michigan Rule 111 sets up more specific pleading standards than the Federal 
Rules. • . . The phrase 'failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules' thus 
makes it clear that it is the more specific standards of the Michigan Rules, and not the 
possibly looser standard of federal practice, that are to determine the adequacy of a 
pleading and its consequent susceptibility to a demand for a more definite statement." 
1 HONIGMAN & HAWKINS 285. 
1963] NEW MICHIGAN PROCEDURAL RULES 1401 
reasonably be expected to frame a responsive pleading thereto."44 
This statement does not appear to mean that the test is the same 
as the test for the similar federal motion, because the committee 
then states that the motion will lie when a bill of particulars has 
been in order.45 Furthermore, the test stated in the federal rule 
was actually deleted from Rule 115. 
The many extended written discussions of the nature and 
advantages of the pleading concepts embodied in Rule 8(a) will 
not be repeated.46 Rather, the point here made is that Michigan 
has chosen to retain a system which differs from the federal rule 
in emphasis. To some extent, the advantages of Rule 8(a) (if one 
concedes that there are advantages) will not be realized. 
When all the arguments for so-called "fact" and "cause of 
action" pleading are stripped of frills and verbiage, such pleading 
is primarily justified by notions that it ensures more "firming" of 
fact issues (including detailed issues) by the pleadings and that it 
enables opponents to "pin" each other down on those issues by 
the pleadings. That these results occur in a particular case is 
often questionable. That these functions should be the primary 
goal of pleading has often been questioned.47 Certainly the federal 
pleading rules were designed to de-emphasize these functions of 
the complaint and answer.48 Comparatively speaking, the Mich-
igan rules seem to emphasize these functions. 
The above observations concerning the Michigan rules may 
be somewhat overstated because of the writer's lack of knowledge 
of actual practice in Michigan. In such case it should be con-
cluded that, if the draftsmen of Rules 111 and 115 intended to 
make federal requirements for a complaint effective, they could 
have accomplished such a result very clearly by adopting Federal 
Rule 8(a) and related rules without change. Confusion has not 
resulted from such a course of action in other states.49 Designed 
to incorporate existing Michigan practice, the above-mentioned 
44 FINAL REPORT 49. 
415 See note 43 supra. 
40 See, e.g., IA BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE § 255 (1960) 
[hereinafter cited as BARRON & HOLTZOFF]; 2 M:ooRE 1692-1721. 
47 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION INSTITUTE, FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 219-25 (Cleveland 1938). 
48 Ibid. 
49 For example, see comments in Clay, May the Federal Civil Rules Be Successfully 
Adopted To Improve State Procedure?, 24 F.R.D. 437, 439-40 (1959). It is important 
to note that, after adoption of Federal Rule S(a), complaints may still be drafted in 
accordance with code pleading principles. Federal Rule S(a) permits, but does not 
require, new types of allegations. 
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Michigan rules seem to have no utility, in any event, as models 
for other states. 
Pleading Matter in Support of Denials. That the philosophy 
of pleading under the federal rules is somewhat different from the 
basic concepts embodied in the Michigan rules is also indicated 
by the retention of another prior Michigan procedure in Rule 
lll.4 This rule emphasizes the fact-issue-forming function of 
· pleadings by retaining a former provision that in connection with 
every denial the pleader shall set forth the substance of the mat-
ters on which he will rely to support such denial.50 
Taken from the rules of the Michigan Railroad Commission, 
this rule was first proposed by the Michigan Procedure Commis-
sion in 1929 with the comment, "It would seem to have great 
possibilities for disclosing meritorious defenses and exposing fic-
titious defenses."51 The Michigan Supreme Court has stated very 
specifically that the purpose of the rule concerning denials is to 
"pin down" the defendant and point up exact fact issues: 
"The latter part of section 2 of rule 23 provides that in con-
nection with every denial the answer shall set forth the sub-
stance of the matters which will be relied upon to support 
such denial. The purpose of the rule is to narrow the issue 
solely to facts in dispute and to make it unnecessary to prove 
those matters upon which there should be no dispute. The 
main purpose of a lawsuit is to elicit the truth, and when the 
facts are known to either side and do not admit of any dis-
pute, they should be frankly stated so as to make it unneces-
sary for the opposite party to offer proof as to such facts and 
thus also save the time of the court. This is especially true 
in cases involving breach of contracts where all the elements 
entering into the contract should be fully and freely brought 
out by declaration and answer so that the issue may be limited 
to the sole point or points over which there is a dispute. A 
stricter observance of the rule is exacted in assumpsit than 
in tort where frequently most of the facts are very much in 
dispute. The rule does not make the declaration a bill for 
discovery, nor does it require the defendant to produce its 
evidence prior to trial. It, however, does require in tort cases 
the setting forth of the substance of the matters which will 
be relied upon to support a denial. There can be no specific 
formula set forth as to what the answer should contain in a 
50 MICH. RuLE lll.4. This rule is the same as former Michigan Rule 23. 
51 MICHIGAN PROCEDURE COMM'N, FINAL AMENDED REPORT 43 (1929). 
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denial in a tort case and the sufficiency of the answer largely 
must rest within the sound discretion of the circuit judge."52 
If this statement is at all accurate, the emphasis placed by the 
instant provision upon the answer as a means of forming detailed 
fact issues is greater in Michigan than in many code pleading 
states. To the extent the rule is operative (and it should be em-
phasized the writer is not acquainted with actual practice in Mich-
igan trial courts), it is a partial throwback to Pomeroy's notion that 
the pleadings should set forth the "naked facts" in order to indi-
cate fact issues. The rule is at the least inconsistent in spirit with 
current concepts of the function of the complaint and answer 
under the federal rules system, and, for that matter, with the re-
mainder of the federal rules system which has been adopted in 
Michigan. 
These conclusions are supported by a further rule providing 
that defendant shall explicitly admit or deny each averment of the 
complaint (or plead "no contest"). It should be added, however, 
that defendant may plead he is without knowledge or informa-
tion to form a belief as to the truth of an averment. Such an 
allegation has the effect of a denial.53 
Additional Issue Pleading Devices. Two additional former 
rules also emphasize the pleading functions of forming fact issues 
and "pinning down" the opponent. Rule 113 provides that, when-
ever a claim or defense is founded upon a ·written instrument 
other than an insurance policy, a copy of the instrument or its 
pertinent parts shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit 
unless specified excuses are stated in the pleading.54 Rule 602 
provides that the plaintiff need not prove the execution of an 
instrument or the handwriting of the defendant in an action on 
the instrument unless the defendant files with his answer an affi-
davit denying the execution or handwriting.55 
If the federal rules are to be adopted in any state, it seems 
preferable to use the federal pleading rules without the addition 
of various "tight" pleading requirements. This conclusion has 
been reached in practically all of the states which have adopted 
the entire federal rules system. 
52 Miller v. General Motors Corp., 279 Mich. 240, 243-44, 271 N.W. 746, 747 (1937). 
53 MICH. RULES 111.2, lll.4. 
54 MICH. RuLE 113.4 (formerly Rule 17, § 5). 
55 MICH. RuLE 602 (formerly Rule 29). The period for filing the affidavit may be 
extended. 
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"Bad Faith" Pleading. Another related former rule was re-
tained and expanded. Rule 111.6 provides: "If it appears at the 
trial that any fact alleged or denied by a pleading ought not to 
have been so alleged or denied and such fact if alleged is not 
proved or if denied is approved or admitted, the court may, if 
the allegation or denial is unreasonable, require the party making 
such allegation or denial to pay to the adverse party the reason-
able expenses incurred in proving or preparing to prove or dis-
prove such fact as the case may be, including reasonable attorney 
fees."56 The rule formerly applied only to denials.57 It is obvi-
ously designed to discourage "bad faith" pleadings.58 
Several objections to the rule are patent. It disregards the 
practical problem of the lawyer who must begin suit without 
complete pre-suit investigation. Strict application of the rule 
would require such investigation prior to suit. In many cases 
such a practice would be wasteful of both time and money. In 
fact, from this standpoint it is inconsistent with the discovery 
rules which afford official investigation techniques only after the 
complaint is drafted and the suit is commenced. On the face of 
the rule, it might be possible for an attorney to sign a complaint 
in good faith under Rule 114 (similar to Federal Rule 11) only 
to be met at trial with sanctions against his client under this rule. 
Additionally, the rule does not recognize the fact that the attorney 
is responsible for the pleadings under Rule 114. When the sub-
stance of Federal Rule 11 has been promulgated, it is more sensi-
ble to penalize the attorney for bad faith than to penalize the 
client. Also, the rule is expressed in wholly ambiguous terms, 
such as "ought not" and "unreasonable." And, in addition, at-
torneys not familiar with Michigan practice would probably guess 
that in many instances enforcement is not sought for various prac-
tical reasons. 
The chief matter of interest in the context of the previous dis-
cussion of other pleading rules is whether Rule 111.6 will tend 
to motivate draftsmen of complaints to be more specific or more 
general. It seems probable that the rule is inoperative in this 
respect, but that, if it has any effect, it motivates more specific 
pleading and tends to "strait-jacket" complaints. Two other states 
56 MICH. RULE 111.6. 
57 Fonner Michigan Rule 17. 
58 The former rule was proposed in 1929 to discourage denials made in bad faith. 
MICHIGAN PROCEDURE CoMM'N, FINAL AimNDED REPORT 36 (1929). 
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which require fact pleading have enacted a similar provision.59 
Federal Rule 11, unsupported by a provision similar to Mich-
igan Rule 111.6, appears to provide a much more practical means 
of securing good faith pleading. At the same time, it is more 
consistent with the goal that complaints may be fairly general and 
need not necessarily contain technical "ultimate" facts. 
Compulsory Counterclaims. Federal Rule 13(a), concerning 
compulsory counterclaims,60 was originally included in the pro-
posed rules by the joint committee, but it was not incorporated 
in the :final draft submitted to the Michigan Supreme Court.61 
If a federal rule has not been effective in a state jurisdiction, 
a proposal that it be adopted may arouse fear and trepidation on 
the part of various members of a state bar in view of the drastic 
nature of the change in practice which the rule would seem to 
make. In Michigan, Professor Blume stated that a compulsory 
counterclaim rule "multiplies the dangers of lawyers losing claims 
by procedural errors."62 In answer to such a charge, it should be 
pointed out that the compulsory counterclaim is not a new, strange, 
and untried device. Not only has it worked well in practice in fed-
eral courts, but also it has been in effect in a few code pleading 
states.83 Nor can the above charge of danger be supported by sub-
stantial statistics. 
The most obvious objection to the device is that a defendant 
may not know that he has a matured claim which relates to the 
subject matter of the suit against him. And even more important, 
although defendant may know of such a claim, he may not be 
aware of its significance under the compulsory counterclaim rule. 
For these reasons, as well as others, defendant's attorney may never 
learn of the claim. 
However, if the federal compulsory counterclaim rule is in 
effect, the dangers may be overcome by pertinent investigation 
on the part of defendants' attorneys prior to answer. Federal Rule 
119 CONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 898, § 52-99 (1959); ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 110, § 41 (1961). 
oo "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving 
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does 
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot 
acquire jurisdiction, except that such a claim need not be so stated if at the time the 
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action." FED. R. 
CIV. P. 13(a). 
61 1 HONIGMAN & HAWKINS 479. 
02 Blume, The Scope of a Cause of Action-Elimination of the Splitting Trap, 
Mich. S.B.J., Dec. 1959, pp. 10, 11. 
03 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 646 n.54 (1947) [hereinafter cited as CLARK]. 
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13(£) also affords a substantial safeguard to defendant, for it pro-
vides that, when a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through 
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice re-
quires, he may by leave of the court set up the counterclaim by 
amendment.64 This rule has been construed liberally.05 Indeed, 
one federal court even permitted an omitted permissive counter-
claim to be made after answer although it was not due to any 
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.66 On a sufficient 
showing it might be possible to set up such a counterclaim after 
judgment.67 In some cases it may be questionable whether or not 
a particular counterclaim arises out of the transaction or occur-
rence which is the subject matter of plaintiff's suit and is there-
fore a compulsory counterclaim under the federal rule. This dif-
ficulty may be obviated by assertion of the counterclaim, and, if 
trial of the counterclaim with the original claim is inconvenient, 
a separate trial can be ordered. 68 
On a more general basis, the compulsory counterclaim rule 
tends to accomplish the basic philosophy that a multiplicity of 
suits should be avoided if possible. If the federal rules system is to 
be used as a model, the compulsory counterclaim rule should be 
considered an integral part of that system. 
Other Changes. The pleading and motion rules contain var-
ious other changes that were made to retain former Michigan 
practice, but for the most part the changes are of minor general 
importance.69 
C. Innovations in Former Michigan Rules and the Federal Rules 
In other jurisdictions which have adopted the federal rules 
system, newly devised changes from the federal rules and former 
state practice are rare. This course was not followed in drafting 
the Michigan pleading rules; they contain several important in-
novations. 
Defenses and Objections. The Michigan pleading rules con-
tain a particularly interesting attempt to ii:nprove the statement 
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 13(£). 
65 3 MOORE 89. 
66 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Shepard, 13 F.R.D. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
67 IA BARRON &: HOLTZOFF § 402, at 627-28. 
68 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
69 Some of the additional changes which favor prior practice are as follows. Special 
provision is made for pleading upon a policy of insurance. MICH. RULE 112.4. Hypothetical 
allegations are not authorized. Also omitted is the provision of Federal Rule 8(e) which 
states that a pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one of two alternative 
statements. A bond may be required of plaintiff. MICH. RuLE 109. 
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and content of procedures which are outlined in Federal Rules 
12 and 56. 
Of course, Federal Rule 12 provides that all defenses and ob-
jections shall be made for the first time in the answer.70 However, 
it further provides that the defenses and objections relating to 
lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, lack of juris-
diction over the subject matter, failure to state a claim, and failure 
to join an indispensable party may be made by motion prior to 
answer.71 If objections going to jurisdiction over the person or 
to improper venue are not made by motion when any of the above 
objections are so made, or if either of these two objections are 
not made by answer when no motion is made prior to answer, 
they are waived.72 The remainder of the objections listed above 
cannot be waived in the pleading stages of a suit.73 Whenever 
any of the objections which can be made by motion or answer 
are so made, such objections can be set for hearing prior to trial.74 
Motions for judgment on the pleadings, to strike, and for more 
definite statement are also "authorized.75 Finally, by motion of the 
parties and permission of the judge, a motion prior to answer on 
the ground that the complaint does not state a claim may be 
treated as a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule 
56.76 Federal Rule 56 spells out the requirements for summary 
judgment. Rules 12 and 56 thus state a relatively simple plan 
for assertion and disposal of major defenses prior to trial. 
The Michigan rules substitute four rules for Federal Rules 12 
and 56. In part these rules retain prior Michigan practice. First, 
it is provided that all defenses except lack of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter and failure to state a claim are waived unless made 
in the answer or by preliminary motion.77 By separate rule, Rule 
116, it is provided that the following objections may be raised by 
answer or motion prior to answer: (1) the court lacks jurisdiction 
of the person or property, (2) the court lacks jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, (3) the party asserting the claim lacks capacity to 
sue, (4) another action is pending, (5) the claim is barred because 
of release, payment, prior judgment, statute of limitations, statute 
70 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b). 
71 Ibid. 
72 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(g), (h). 
73 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h). 
74 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(d). 
711 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(c), (e), and (f). 
76 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b). 
77 MICH. RULE 111.3. 
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of frauds, infancy or other disability of moving party or other dis-
position of the claim before commencement of the action. These 
defenses by motion may be heard on affidavits and other evidence, 
and the court may also order immediate trial of these defenses 
when made by answer and render judgment on them or postpone 
the hearing until trial on the merits. If a jury trial is demanded 
prior to the hearing on the defenses listed under (5) above, the 
hearing must be postponed until trial on the merits. A defendant 
may make no more than one motion under this rule, but he may 
use any or all of the grounds listed above in support of the motion. 
However, with one exception, a motion based upon any one or 
more of such objections does not waive the right to make the re-
mainder of such objections by answer. If the objection to lack 
of jurisdiction over the person or property is not made when a 
motion under the rule is first filecl, it is waived.78 Rule 116 is 
entitled "accelerated judgment"; it is designed to afford adjudi-
cation of the listed defenses prior to a full trial on the merits. 79 
Rule 117 then provides for a "motion for summary judgment." 
This motion may be one for judgment because the complaint 
does not state a claim on its face ( or because the answer does not 
state a valid defense), or because there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact.80 Thus, in effect, the "motion for summary 
judgment" will serve the same functions as a motion to dismiss 
because no claim is stated under Federal Rule 12(b), a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule 12(c), and a 
motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule 56.81 This 
motion may be made by plaintiff after defendant responds to the 
complaint by motion or answer and by defendant before or after 
answer. Provisions similar to those stated in the federal summary 
judgment rule are included. Provisions for affidavits are contained 
in Rule 116. In contrast to Rule 116, Rule 117 is designed to 
test the law of a plaintiff's case and the existence of factual dis-
putes.82 And finally, as indicated in the first part of this article, 
Rule 115 provides for a motion for more definite statement and 
a motion to strike. 
One principal change from the federal rules system is the addi-
tion of defenses which may be raised by motion (numbers (3), (4), 
78 MICH. RULE 116.2. 
79 1 HONIGMAN & HAWKINS 336-37. 
80 MICH. RULE 117. 
81 FINAL REPORT 54. 
82 1 HONIGMAN & HAWKINS 358-59. 
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and (5) above) to the defenses mentioned in Federal Rule 12(b). 
In addition, as mentioned previously, it is specifically provided 
that, in the discretion of the court, trial and judgment may be 
had on these defenses prior to trial of the merits (if a jury is not 
demanded on the defenses listed under (5) above). Defenses con-
cerning jurisdiction and failure to state a claim can be handled 
in the same way. Of course, under the federal rules defenses 
going to jurisdiction, venue, failure to state a claim, and failure 
to join an indispensable party may be disposed of prior to trial 
on the merits under the terms of Federal Rule 12(c). 
The mentioning of the additional defenses listed in Rule 116 
seems desirable. Defenses such as lack of capacity to sue and the 
bar of statutes of limitations have caused difficulty under the fed-
eral rules. However, it is difficult to find any advantage in the 
other Michigan revisions of Federal Rules 12 and 56. There 
seems to be no advantage in providing one rule for the defenses 
listed under Rule 116, as summarized above, and a second rule 
which makes separate provision for attack on the complaint, judg-
ment on the pleadings and summary judgment. Moreover, the 
rules fail to state how motions under one rule are related to mo-
tions under the other rule. Apparently there can be three stages 
of motions prior to answer-a motion to strike or for more defi-
nite statement, a motion for accelerated judgment and a motion 
for summary judgment. Furthermore, the changes in content of 
Rules 12(b) and 56 could have been made within the order and 
arrangement of Federal Rules 12 and 56. As it is, the rearrange-
ment of the general content of Rules 12 and 56 in the Michigan 
rules is not convenient for use in other states.83 
One other change from Federal Rule 12(b) and prior Mich-
igan practice should be mentioned. The federal rule makes im-
proper venue a defense to be raised under the rule by motion or 
answer. The objection is waived if not made when a motion on 
the other grounds listed in Rule 12(b) is made, or, if no such 
motion is made, when the objection is not made in the answer.84 
The Michigan rules treat venue objections under separate rules 
83 Additional changes in content from Federal Rules 12 and 56 are fully discussed 
in Comment, Preliminary Motion Practice Under the Michigan General Court Rules 
of 1963, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 399 (1962). 
The provisions in the new New York rules for a motion to dismiss and a motion for 
summary judgment are somewhat similar to the Michigan provisions. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. 
LAW &: Ruus Art. 32, R. 3211-12 (1962). 
84 Fm. R. CIV. P. 12(b), (g), (h). 
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relating to venue.85 An objection to improper venue or a request 
for change of venue properly laid (for convenience of witnesses, 
etc.) must be made by a motion for change of venue filed before or 
at the time defendant files an answer, or upon a "deferred motion" 
after answer, "if the court is satisfied that the facts upon which 
the deferred motion is based were not and could not with reason-
able diligence have been known to the defendant until 10 days 
prior to the motion."86 If no motion is made within these tem-
poral limitations, the right to change of venue is waived.87 
Federal Rule 12 only governs change of venue when venue is 
improper and does not govern motions for change of venue when 
it is properly laid.88 This is an omission which should be remedied 
when the rule is adopted for state practice. The Michigan device 
of treating a motion for change of venue on any ground as a sepa-
rate subject and creating a motion independent of other motions 
is certainly feasible, but there seems to be very little reason to 
deal with improper venue objections in a manner different from 
procedures for objection to lack of jurisdiction over the person. 
It seems desirable to retain the improper venue provision of Fed-
eral Rule 12(b). If this course is adopted, special provision must 
be made for change of venue for convenience.80 
Replies. The Michigan rules also contain an innovation re-
garding replies. A reply "to an answer demanding a reply" and 
a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such are required.00 
This provision should be contrasted with Federal Rule 7 which 
requires a reply to be made to a counterclaim denominated as 
such, but otherwise does not require a reply unless ordered by 
the court. 91 
If there is no counterclaim denominated as such, why should 
a reply to an answer be required or be dispensed with at the whim 
85 MICH. RULES 401-04. 
86 MICH. RULES 401-02. 
87 MICH. RULE 409. 
88 Nowotny v. Turner, 203 F. Supp. 802 (M.D.N.C. 1962); Ferment-Acid Corp. v. 
Miles Lab., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Spence v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 89 F. Supp. 
823 (N.D. Ohio 1950). 
so The time limits for a motion for change of venue for convenience or in the 
interests of justice should probably be related in some way to possible delays of trial. 
In "Washington, Federal Rule 12(b) was changed to cover motions for change of venue 
for convenience of witnesses and in the interests of justice. This change seems to fix the 
time limit too early in the suit. At the stage of answer it may not be clear that there 
is reason for change of venue on these grounds. 
90 MICH. RULE 110.1. 
01 FED. R. Crv. P. 7. 
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of defendant? Taken at face value, the rule allows a defendant 
to state any defensive matter affirmatively in the answer even 
though it could clearly be proved under an appropriate denial 
and is not in any sense "new matter," and then authorizes de-
fendant to require a reply of plaintiff to such matter. At the same 
time, such allegations constituting argumentative denials are not 
subject to a motion to strike under the federal rules.92 The only 
joint committee comment that has any bearing on this interpre-
tation is a statement that, since a reply is required only when 
demanded by the answer or when there is a counterclaim denomi-
nated as such, "there will be no reasonable excuse for failure to 
file a required reply, since the plaintiff can easily ascertain from 
his opponent's pleading whether one is necessary."93 This may 
be true, but by like token the rule seems to require a reply at the 
option of defendant when there should not be a reply by any 
standard of judgment. Also, if defendant does not demand a reply 
to his answer, the joint committee suggests that plaintiff may still 
file a reply to new matter in the answer.94 
Thus, this rule is a far cry from the federal rule concerning 
replies to answers. The sensible theory which underlies the fed-
eral rule is based on the notion that the complaint and answer 
are usually sufficient to give notice of plaintiff's claims and de-
fendant's defenses in the absence of a counterclaim. If the court 
can be convinced otherwise, it may order a reply to an answer.95 
"No Contest" Pleading. An innovation in defensive pleading 
is made by a provision that a defendant may plead "no contest to 
one or more of the claims or parts thereof stated against him."96 
It is further provided that such a plea permits the action to pro-
ceed without the necessity of proof of the claim or part thereof 
to which such a plea has been made, and that the plea has the 
effect of an admission for the purpose of the pending action only.97 
According to the joint committee, this pleading is somewhat 
analogous to a plea of nolo contendere in criminal proceedings. 
92 2 MOORE 2320. See cases cited in IA BARRON & HoLTZOFF § 368, at 499 n.52. 
However, the motion to strike may be available in this situation under the Michigan 
rules. 
93 FINAL REPORT 38. 
94 Ibid. 
95 See discussion in IA BARRON & HoLTZOFF § 243, at 13-14. 
96 "Whenever a responsive pleading is required, the pleader shall either (1) set forth 
an explicit admission or denial of each averment upon which the adverse party relies, 
or (2) plead no contest to I or more of the claims or parts thereof stated against him." 
MICH. RULE III.2. 
07 MICH, RULE 111.5. 
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It will admit liability in the specific case in which it is made; it 
will establish defendant as a party entitled to notice of further 
proceedings; and it will result in a judgment which has the res 
judicata effect of a default judgment.98 
It has been suggested by Mr. Honigman and Professor Hawkins 
that in Michigan there is some room for doubt on the question of 
whether a default judgment precludes litigation of common ques-
tions of fact in a subsequent case involving a different cause of 
action.99 But they also take the position that the language of the 
rule indicates that a fact to which a "no contest" plea is made is 
open to litigation in a subsequent action on a different claim.100 
It might be added that, if an analogy is to be made to the plea 
of nolo contendere in a criminal case, the "no contest" rule 
should have such an effect.101 It is also suggested that the rule is 
justified by the notion that, "if the purpose of res judicata is to 
conserve judicial energy, that purpose is better advanced by a 
policy which encourages no contest over issues which are of no 
importance except as they might become involved in collateral 
proceedings."102 
The "no contest" rule seems to be much broader than the 
above observations indicate. It seems to do more than preclude 
the operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in certain in-
stances. The wording of the rule indicates that the pleading does 
not constitute an admission which could be used as an evidential 
admission in any other suit. This has been the usual result of a 
plea of nolo contendere as well.103 It also appears that a pleading 
of "no contest" could not be used as an inconsistent statement 
to impeach the defendant as a witness in some other case. 
Since the evident purpose of the rule is to permit the admis-
sion of facts in a particular suit by a method which would pre-
clude the assertion of collateral estoppel in another case or 
preclude the use of the pleading as an evidential admission, the 
rule might afford undue tactical advantages to a defendant in 
certain situations. Suppose that in separate suits brought by dif-
ferent plaintiffs the defendant is charged with acts which caused 
98 FINAL REPORT 42-43. 
99 1 HoNIGMAN 8:: HAWKINS 200-01. 
100 Id. at 200. 
101 Lenvin 8:: Meyers, Nola Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51 YALE L.J. 
1255, 1263 (1942). 
102 1 HoNIGMAN 8:: HAWKINS 201. 
103 See 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1066, at 58 (3d ed. 1940); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law 
§ 425(3) (1961). 
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air or stream pollution injuring the property of the respective 
plaintiffs. For tactical reasons having little to do with the actual 
merits on the facts and law, he can plead "no contest" in certain 
of the cases as to certain issues without prejudice to contrary posi-
tions in the remaining cases. Should the defendant have such an 
advantage? In such types of cases there is a possibility that the 
"no contest" rule will not operate to conserve judicial energy. 
The plea of nolo contendere in criminal cases can only be 
made with the permission of the court,1°4 but under the instant 
rule there is no such safeguard. On the face of the rule there is 
no limitation on the situations in which the pleading may be used. 
If this is true, is it not desirable and conservative for a defendant 
to plead "no contest" to every allegation he would admit if the 
"no contest" rule were unavailable? Defendant would not be 
penalized. There seems to be no reason for less liberality in grant-
ing leave to amend such a pleading than in granting leave to 
amend an outright admission. If he amends his answer of "no 
contest" to state a denial, it is arguable that his original pleading 
cannot be used as an evidential admission in the case. In most 
jurisdictions an admission which is amended and changed to a 
denial may be so used.105 Thus, it seems possible that "no contest" 
pleading to particular allegations may replace admissions in many 
instances. There is certainly no guarantee that such pleading will 
be used only with respect to issues which may be of importance 
only in collateral proceedings. 
The conflict of such a practice with the philosophy that a 
trial is a search for truth rather than a game should be given some 
consideration. The effects of its solicitude for defendants should 
not be ignored.100 Inevitably such a practice will be misunderstood 
by clients and, in some cases, even by lawyers. At least, the plea 
of nolo contendere seems to have been misunderstood in many 
instances. It has been called a gentlemen's plea of guilty, a plea 
which has no implication of a plea of guilty, a plea of implied 
guilt, and a plea which is a compromise between the defendant 
and the state.107 As a mere guess, one might predict that a plea 
104 Mack, Nolo Contendere: Its Use in Michigan, Mich. S.B.J., Aug. 1958, pp. 20, 21. 
105 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 510 (1954). 
106 Perhaps it could be argued that the federal pleading rules favor plaintiffs over 
defendants and that "no contest" pleading restores some balance. In the first place, the 
premise of such an argument is questionable. Secondly, the advantage given the de-
fendant has no rational relation to possible present advantages that plaintiffs enjoy. 
107 Lenvin &: Meyers, supra note IOI, at 1255. 
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of "no contest" in a civil case will be regarded by the public as 
an obfuscation of the law. With some temerity it is suggested that 
the device must be assessed in the light of such possible public 
misunderstanding. Thus, serious questions may be raised con-
cerning this device which is aimed at protecting defendants 
against conclusive and evidential admissions in other suits. At 
present its advantages appear to be minimal, although experience 
may justify it. 
IV. JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND PARTIES 
With a few exceptions, the Michigan joinder and party rules 
are substantial copies of their analogous counterparts in the fed-
eral rules. There is very little revision to preserve some of the dif-
ferent former Michigan practice, but three notable innovations 
in federal and prior Michigan practice merit consideration. 
A. Compulsory ]oinder of Claims 
Hailed as a meritorious reform, Michigan Rule 203.1 provides 
for compulsory joinder of claims and seeks to avoid the so-called 
"splitting trap."108 Specifically, the rule provides that a pleader 
shall state every matured claim against an opposing party if it 
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the action and does not require the presence of third 
parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. It is 
further provided, "Failure by motion or at the pre-trial confer-
ence to object to improper misjoinder of claims or failure to join 
claims required to be joined constitutes a waiver of the required 
joinder rules and the judgment shall not merge more than the 
claims actually litigated."109 Rule 302 requires the judge to in-
quire of the parties at the pre-trial conference whether plaintiff 
has joined all claims under the terms of the joinder rule. 
The rule has been explained by the joint committee, Mr. 
Honigman, Professor Hawkins, and Professor BlumeY0 Their 
discussion will not be repeated at length, but these authorities state 
that the Michigan judicial decisions involving questions of the 
splitting of a cause of action require joinder of claims arising out 
108 Blume, The Scope of a Cause of Action-Elimination of the Splitting Trap, 
Mich. S.B.J., Dec. 1959, pp. 10, 13. 
109 MICH. RULE 203.1. 
110 FINAL REPORT 66-67; I HoNIGMAN &: HAWKINS 474-79; Blume, supra note 108, at IO. 
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of the same transaction or occurrence.m Under this case law, a 
plaintiff would be precluded from asserting a cause of action which 
he could have asserted in a former action which went to judg-
ment. Rule 203.1 is designed to incorporate this case authority 
which precludes splitting a cause of action into the new Michigan 
rules system as a compulsory joinder rule.112 Plaintiff is directed 
to bring all of the indicated claims in his first suit, but, to avoid 
unfairness to him and the harsh results of the former rule against 
splitting a cause of action, the new rule provides in effect that, if 
the plaintiff does not join all claims, as is required, and if the 
defendant fails to object, the related claims which were not joined 
may be the subject of another suit without concern over the prior 
case law against splitting. If defendant does object to a failure to 
join certain allegedly related claims and the judge rules in his 
favor, plaintiff may then join the claims. Should plaintiff, how-
ever, then fail to join the required claims, it is suggested that such 
claims are lost by operation of the principles of res judicata.113 At 
the same time it is said that the rule should have no effect upon 
the application of res judicata to claims actually litigated in the 
case, and that it should not change the res judicata effect on fac-
tual issues actually litigated.114 
If the rule operates as indicated above, it may do away with 
some of the unfair results of the rule against splitting a cause of 
action. A plaintiff will not ordinarily lose a claim he should have 
prosecuted in an original suit in which he obtained a judgment. 
At the same time, defendant will be given a chance to object to 
failure to join related claims, but he will not be given an op-
portunity to wait and in a later suit on a related claim object 
for the first time that plaintiff has split his cause of action and 
therefore is precluded from bringing the subsequent suit. 
Two principal difficulties have been suggested. The first is 
that the rule will not operate as intended if defendant is permitted 
to object within the terms of the rule without specifically point-
ing out a claim which he thinks should be joined.115 A proper 
interpretation of the rule should surmount this difficulty. The 
111 In support of this proposition the joint committee cites Arnold v. Masonic Coun-
try Club, 268 Mich. 430, 256 N.W. 472 (1934), and Tuttle v. Everhot Heater Co., 264 
Mich. 60, 249 N.W. 467 (1933). FINAL REPORT 66. 
112 FINAL REPORT 66. 
113 1 HONIGMAN &: HAWKINS 477. 
114 Id. at 476. 
115 Id. at 477-79. 
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second difficulty concerns questions relating to the effect of an 
appeal or failure to appeal. Such questions are fully discussed by 
Mr. Honigrnan and Professor Hawkins.116 
In situations in which plaintiff obtains a judgment in an 
original action and then commences a second suit on a related 
claim, additional general questions are also suggested by the rule. 
If Rule 203 were not in effect, and if it were true that the rule 
against splitting a cause of action required a plaintiff to join 
claims arising from the same transaction, then plaintiff would 
have nothing to gain by omitting such a claim in an original suit 
against the defendant. Such claims would then be omitted only 
through oversight. The penalty would be the defense of res ju-
dicata in a second suit on the omitted claims. In this situation, 
Rule 203 may tend to operate only to abolish the res judicata rule, 
because defendants may often fail to object to the nonjoinder of 
related claims. Even· if it is assumed that plaintiffs usually fail to 
join related claims under Rule 203 because of oversight (as was 
probably true under the former Michigan case law), defendants 
may often be unable to ascertain the true reason for omission of 
claims known to them. The natural reaction in many cases may 
be for defendants to take a chance that plaintiff is unaware of 
the possibility of making the claim or of successfully prosecuting 
it if he is actually aware of the possibility. Why educate the plain-
tiff? Also, defendants will not object when they have overlooked 
a claim of plaintiff or have concluded that an omitted claim can-
not be successful. 
In other words, the rule may operate so that it will not result 
in more joinders of claims than if the rule were not in existence. 
At the same time, it may result in more multiple suits than would 
formerly have been possible. If it does so operate, the fundamental 
question will be whether avoidance of the hardship on plaintiffs 
of the rule against splitting a cause of action justifies a rule with 
this result.117 Of course, at present whether such a result will be 
realized is speculative. 
The rule and the above remarks are based on the notion that 
116 Id. at 478-79. 
117 Of the complaint that the "splitting" rule is harsh, Judge Clark has said: "Com-
pulsion put upon a litigant to settle his disputes at one time not merely is a proper 
safeguard to defendants, but saves time and expense to the court. In view of modem 
liberal provisions as to amendment, or even for starting a new action where a previous 
one has failed for reasons not going to the merits, the hardship upon a misinformed 
plaintiff is small." CLARK 474-75. 
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the Michigan case law which precludes splitting a cause of action 
and Rule 203 both require joinder of claims arising out of the 
same transaction.118 However, if the new Michigan rule is adopted 
in other jurisdictions, its wording suggests certain basic questions 
in connection with existing rules against splitting a cause of action. 
The rule against splitting has been based on a rather uncertain 
concept of a cause of action.119 If Rule 203 were in effect in other 
states, the phrase "claims arising out of the same transaction or 
occurrence" in the rule might have a broader scope than the term 
"cause of action" as interpreted in cases establishing the rule 
against splitting a cause of action.120 Thus, to the extent that 
objections by a defendant under the rule would force plaintiff 
to add claims to those originally asserted in his complaint, the 
rule might force the joinder of some claims which plaintiff would 
not need to join if the ordinary rule against splitting a cause of 
action were the only sanction he would have to consider for failure 
to assert an "entire" cause of action. For example, in some states 
it has been held that there are two causes of action or claims when 
defendant's act injures plaintiff's person and property.121 If Rule 
203.1 were adopted, would there be two claims related to the same 
transaction? 
The terminology of the rule is not completely clear from a 
related viewpoint. Under case law which involves splitting a cause 
of action, the courts have sometimes inquired whether plaintiff 
has one entire claim or several claims.122 By its terms, Rule 203.1 
requires examination of the question whether plaintiff has several 
claims arising from the same transaction, or merely several in-
dependent claims. It is apparent that the word "claims" is used 
differently in these two contexts. The use of the word "claim-" or 
"cause of action" in the case law suggests that there may be a 
further distinction under Rule 203.1. In some instances, it may 
be necessary to distinguish between one claim, claims related to 
the same transaction, and independent claims. 
Suppose defendant commits acts which constitute a continuous 
trespass or nuisance. Does plaintiff have one claim, claims related 
118 See note Ill supra. 
llO CLARK 476-77. 
120 Professor Blume has stated a contrary conclusion. Blume, Required Joinder of 
Claims, 45 MICH. L. REv. 797, 802 (1947). 
121 See cases cited in CLARK 488 n.185. 
122 "[A]n entire claim •.. cannot be divided and made the subject of several 
suits • • • . The rule does not prevent • . . the prosecution of several actions upon 
several causes of action." Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N.Y. 548, 554 (1858). 
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to the same transaction, or independent claims? If he has one 
claim, Rule 203.1 is not operative, by its terms. 
Perhaps the above question can be dismissed as one concern-
ing labels and not substance, particularly if the rule is intended 
to have exactly the same scope of operation as case law concerning 
splitting a cause of action. In practice, the rule may prove to be 
a desirable reform. Nevertheless, it appears that there is sufficient 
doubt concerning its probable effectiveness and advantages to 
justify postponement of its use as a model elsewhere. In support 
of this conclusion, it is also pertinent to consider the attitude that 
the rule against splitting a cause of action does not usually cause 
difficulty for plaintiffs. 
B. Compulsory ]oinder of Parties 
A complete revision of Federal Rule 19 relating to compulsory 
joinder of parties may prove to be an abortive attempt to improve 
the rule in form and content for state practice. First, the disad-
vantages of adopting Federal Rule 19 for state practice will be 
reviewed, and then the Michigan revision will be discussed. 
Most of the federal rules operate with comparative practical 
convenience, and contain standards which are comprehensible 
from the rule itself. In contrast, Federal Rule 19, the required 
joinder of parties rule, does not afford these advantages.123 With-
out the embroidery of case law it is not intelligible. It can be given 
meaning only in the light of practice before and after its adop-
tion.124 And the wording is obscure when such practice is taken 
into account. Perhaps it may be restated as follows: "All persons 
must be joined as parties to a suit as indicated in cases in the 
federal courts." 
123 "(a) Necessary ]oinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of subdivision (b) 
of this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be joined on 
the same side as plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who should join as a plaintiff 
refuses to do so, be may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary 
plaintiff. 
"(b) Effect of Failure To Join. When persons who are not indispensable, but who ought 
to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties, have 
not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to both service 
of process and venue and can be made parties without depriving the court of jurisdic-
tion of the parties before it, the court shall order them summoned to appear in the 
action. The court in its discretion may proceed in the action without making such 
persons parties, if its jurisdiction over them as to either service of process or venue 
can be acquired only by their consent or voluntary appearance or if, though they are 
subject to its jurisdiction, their joinder would deprive the court of jurisdiction of the 
parties before it; but the judgment rendered therein does not affect the rights or liabil-
ities of absent persons." FED. R. Crv. P. I9(a), (b). 
124 3 MooRE 2144-45. 
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As a result, it is often difficult to point to any concrete ad-
vantages that such a rule will afford when compared to existing 
compulsory joinder rules in particular states. Although it may 
broaden the area of compulsory joinder, it also substitutes a large 
and complicated field of case law in federal courts for the familiar 
existing body of state judicial authority. When opponents of the 
federal rules system make such an objection to the adoption of a 
rule similar to Federal Rule 19, the only practical direct answer 
is a rejoinder that the federal rule embodies most of the existing 
state law. This reply is essentially unsatisfactory. A conscientious 
attorney will be impelled to asc~rtain what the federal cases in-
dicate as a proper course of action in any particular situation. 
Particularly annoying is the conflict of opinion in the federal 
courts concerning the role that state law should play in the ap-
plication of Federal Rule 19.125 It is sometimes even difficult to 
ascertain whether or not a federal decision on compulsory joinder 
of parties follows a particular state rule of the state whose sub-
stantive law governs the case.126 
There is also a conflict concerning the basic philosophy which 
should underlie the rule. On one side is the concept that results 
of existing federal decisions are all important. The authority of 
similar cases is thus emphasized.127 However, mechanical applica-
tion of such cases may thereby result. On the other side, to quote 
Professor Reed's study of required joinder problems, " ... ques-
tions of required joinder should be resolved less and less on the 
basis of pat formulations which provide generalized characteriza-
tions of parties, and more and more on case by case consideration 
of the inter-related and sometimes competing interests ... .''128 
This approach was advocated even in the case of the relatively 
simple general situation of suits by joint obligees and against 
joint obligors.129 It leads to the conclusion that Federal Rule 19 
is too rigid. 
125 For an attempt to synthesize all of the cases, see 2 BARRON &: HoLTZOFF § 511, 
at 91-94. 
120 See the majority and concurring opinions in the leading case, Greenleaf v. Safe-
way Trails, Inc., 140 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1944). 
127 Referring to the term "joint interest," which is used to describe indispensable 
parties in Federal Rule 19(a), Professor Moore stated, "The phrase must be construed 
to mean those who were necessary or indispensable parties under the previous practice." 
3 MOORE 2144. 
128 Reed, Compulsory ]oinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pt. 2), 55 MICH, L. R:ev. 
483, 537 (1957). 
129 Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pt. 1), 55 MICH. L. R:ev. 
327, 366-67, 374 (1957). 
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In the face of these and other objections, most of the states 
which have adopted the entire federal rules system have never-
theless adopted Federal Rule 19 without making any significant 
changes. The difficulties of attempting to revise it have probably 
proved too formidable in the midst of a movement to adopt all of 
the federal rules. It is much less difficult to accept the rule with 
all its inadequacies than to promote a revision-even if agree-
ment can eventually be reached concerning a particular revision. 
Contrary to this usual course of action, the Michigan joint com-
mittee secured the adoption of a substantial revision of Federal 
Rule 19. 
The Michigan rule that is similar to Federal Rule 19(a) pro-
vides that persons having such interests in the subject matter of 
an action that their presence is essential to permit the court to 
render complete relief shall be made parties. The reference in 
Federal Rule 19(a) to persons "having a joint interest" is de-
leted.130 Federal Rule 19(b) has also been completely reworded, 
and provisions substantially similar to those in the New York 
required party rule have been adopted. The Michigan rule states 
that the persons having the requisite interest shall be summoned 
to appear if they are subject to the jurisdiction of the court. If 
they cannot be summoned to appear, the court may grant ap-
propriate relief to those who are parties to prevent a failure oi 
justice. In determining whether or not to proceed in such case, 
the court is to consider four matters. It should take into account 
whether it can render a valid judgment between the existing 
parties, whether plaintiff has another effective remedy if the case 
is dismissed, whether prejudice will result from the nonjoinder 
to defendant or the absent person, and whether such prejudice, if 
any, can be avoided or lessened by conditions in an order or the 
judgment of the court. Finally, where a person has not been joined 
who should have been joined, judgment may still be rendered 
against plaintiff when "it is determined that the plaintiff is en-
titled to no relief as a matter of substantive law."131 
130 "Necessary Joinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 208 and of sub-rule 205.2, 
persons having such interests in the subject matter of an action that their presence in 
the action is essential to permit the court to render complete relief shall be made parties 
and be joined as plaintiffs or defendants and aligned in accordance with their respective 
interests." MICH. RULE 205.1. The source of this section is the New York provision that 
persons "who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the per-
sons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably effected [sic]" shall be 
joined. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LA.w & RULES Art. 10, R. 1001 (1962). 
131 MICH. RULE 205.2. The model for this section is the New York provision which 
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The general scheme of the rule seems to reflect the influence 
of a study by Professor Reed and a study in support of a some-
what similar provision in the new New York statute.132 Although 
it is impossible to discuss Professor Reed's views in detail, his 
formulation of ideal guiding principles in required joinder cases 
will be summarized to explain the thrust of the Michigan revision. 
Professor Reed states that in required joinder problems the courts 
should consider two competing policies. On one side is the policy 
of seeking to avoid an adverse factual effect on the interests of 
absent persons. However, the court need not take into account 
the legal effect of its determination of the case upon such persons' 
rights in determining the controversy between the present parties, 
because the court's determination will not and cannot legally 
affect such rights.133 On the other side is the policy of "giving a 
petitioner as much merited relief as possible."134 Here, according 
to Professor Reed, the obligation of the court is to try to devise 
a way to proceed in the absence of a person who should be present 
but who cannot be made a party. The desire to do justice "entire 
rather than by halves" should not be emphasized.135 With these 
principles in mind, there must be an inquiry by the court into 
the circumstances of each claim in which a joinder problem 
arises.136 Thus, joinder questions should be considered on a case-
by-case basis. 
To summarize, the new Michigan rule directs that all should 
be joined to permit the granting of complete relief, but, if persons 
who should be joined for such purpose cannot be joined, the 
court should proceed and give any effective relief it can to the 
actual parties to the suit. In deciding whether or not to proceed, 
it should consider all of the factors mentioned in the rule.137 
Theoretically, the above principles and the rule may embody 
ideal standards for joinder. But how will the rule work in the 
states that an action may proceed in the absence of one who should be a party "when 
justice requires." Similar factors are listed for consideration by the court. The New 
York statute does not contain the clause whiEh authorizes judgment for plaintiff on 
the law. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw &: RULES Art. 10, R. 1001 (1962). 
132 Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pts. 1-2), 55 MICH. L. REv. 
327, 483 (1957); 1957 Report of the Temporary Comm'n on the Courts, Compulsory 
]oinder of Parties, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 6(b), at 233-56. 
133 1957 Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts, supra note 132, at 
336, 338. See also Reed, supra note 132, at 338 (pt. I). 
134 Reed, supra note 132, at 337-38 (pt. I). 
135 Id. at 339. 
130 Ibid. 
137 See the discussion in I HONIGl\fAN &: HAWKINS 546-47. 
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day-to-day practice of attorneys before a state's trial courts? Will 
its idealistic goal of case-by-case treatment be realized? Perhaps 
the method used by Mr. Honigman and Professor Hawkins in 
explaining the rule is an indication. First, they discuss the general 
principles embodied in the rule and the general way in which it 
should operate. Then they proceed to explain its operation in 
some general types of cases (and properly so). For example, how 
should joint tortfeasors be treated? It is said that since they need 
not have been joined prior to adoption of the rule, and the sub-
stantive law prior to the rule was that complete relief could be ob-
tained against any one of them, joint tortfeasors need not be 
joined.188 In a discussion of other types of parties, a general result 
is suggested in at least eight situations.189 No detraction from the 
excellent discussion is intended; in fact, a sufficient explanation 
of the rule makes such a discussion necessary. The point is that 
lawyers, judges, and even commentators on procedural rules must 
live in a practical, workaday world which requires a certain num-
ber of rules of thumb in procedural matters. Inevitably they will 
mechanize general rules. Precedents will not be limited to com-
pletely particularized fact situations which appeared in pre-
viously decided cases. 
Perhaps it is unfair at this early stage in the use of the rule 
to predict that it will not in the long run accomplish the resolu-
tion of required joinder problems "less and less on the basis of 
pat formulations which provide generalized characterizations of 
parties," to use Professor Reed's words, but, as a mere guess, it is 
not likely to accomplish such a result any more than would the 
adoption of Federal Rule 19. In spite of this guess, it may en-
gender a climate in which Michigan judges, compared to those 
governed by Federal Rule 19, will strive with greater effect to 
retain cases in the absence of persons who should be joined but 
cannot be joined and to proceed in order to grant all possible 
relief between the actual parties. This result is a principal goal. 
Is the generality of the revised rule (and the similar New York 
rule) any more desirable than the generality of Federal Rule 19? 
If Rule 19 is to be revised, it might well be made specific in its 
application to certain types of cases. For example, in a state which 
does not authorize suit by or against partners in the partnership 
1ss Id. at 551. 
139 Id. at 551-57. 
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name, it seems desirable to spell out the rules of joinder in suits 
by or against partnerships. In short, it is difficult to refrain, as 
space limits require, from expressing disagreement in part with 
the complete case-by-case approach advocated by Professor Reed.140 
Suffice it to say that some consideration should be given to the 
fact that party rules, like all procedural rules, should be designed 
for everyday use in routine cases and not only for use in compli-
cated cases. Furthermore, they should be useful to all members of 
the bar and not just to the most astute attorneys. They should not 
place a premium on uncertainty of result. Finally, it should be 
remembered that party rules are not simply rules for the courts. 
In particular instances it is important to identify, prior to suit, 
the parties who must be joined if suit is brought. When the above 
considerations are taken into account, the Michigan revision and 
the somewhat similar New York rule do not seem to be ideal 
solutions of the problems raised by Federal Rule 19. At least 
Federal Rule 19, with its encrustation of case law, furnishes some 
basis for prediction. Also, the Michigan revision furnishes little 
improvement over Federal Rule 19 in regard to the problem of 
distinguishing between parties the plaintiff need not join in any 
event and those parties he must join under the rule if joinder is 
possible. On the affirmative side, the Michigan rule should ac-
complish one vital reform. It should abolish the notion that ab-
sence of an indispensable party is a jurisdictional defect. 
Two specific innovations in the Michigan rule merit further 
comment. Rule 111.3 provides, in effect, that failure to object 
to non joinder of required parties by motion or by responsive 
pleading waives the objection. Supporting this rule is the theory 
that nonjoinder is not a jurisdictional defect.141 Furthermore, the 
compulsory joinder rule is regarded as being primarily for the 
benefit of the defendant, and thus he should take timely advantage 
140 The Michigan and New York rules seem to reflect in part a notion expressed 
by the New York advisory committee. "These [the factors for consideration listed in the 
rules] are the factors which should be considered in determining questions of indispen-
sability. In varying degrees the courts have considered them, though often incompletely, 
and with unfortunate language which misleads the mechanically minded. The subject 
defies precise written rule; it calls for discernment as to how the various factors should 
be weighed in the individual case. However, general reference in a statute or court 
rule to the various interests involved, indicating the sort of attention which should be 
given to the matter, would be helpful to both bench and bar." 1957 Report of the 
Temporary Comm'n on the Courts, supra note 132, at 251. 
141 MICH. RULE 111.3; 1 HoNIGMAN &: HAWKINS 546; Reed, supra note 132, at 332-34 
(pt. 1). 
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of it.142 Mr. Honigman and Professor Hawkins suggest that if a 
nonjoinder objection is first made on appeal, the trial court's 
decision should not be reversed.143 They also suggest, however, 
that since Rule 207 authorizes parties to be added at any stage of 
the proceedings, the appellate court may still consider the factors 
listed in Rule 203.1 and decide whether or not the judgment 
should be allowed to stand. In this situation it has been stated that 
the court should not consider prejudice to the defendant arising 
from the nonjoinder because the defendant has waived any such 
objection.144 
Some disagreement with the above ideas could be expressed. 
For example, is it always true that the objection is primarily for 
the benefit of defendant? Conceding that the above-mentioned 
notions are valid, should it be concluded that joinder questions 
should be raised at the latest by the responsive pleading? Party 
questions can often be difficult and complicated, and they will 
tend to be even more difficult if a true case-by-case approach is 
actually taken by the courts. This consideration indicates that 
defendant should not be required to raise the joinder issue at the 
stage of answer under the penalty of waiver. He should be given 
the opportunity to raise the objection for the first time within 
some period of time after the pleading stage. Although the non-
joinder objection should not be regarded as jurisdictional, it 
is arguable that recognition should be given to its importance. 
The second important innovation in the compulsory joinder 
rule is that part which provides that, if there is a failure to join 
a person who should have been joined under the rule, the court 
may enter a judgment against a plaintiff who is not entitled to 
relief as a matter of substantive law.145 In support of this provi-
sion it is argued that a judgment that a plaintiff is not entitled 
to relief as a matter of substantive law should not be reversed 
simply for failure to join a necessary party.146 In addition, since 
the rule is also effective at the trial level, it seems to reflect the 
broad viewpoint that failure to join a person who should be joined 
under the rule is of no moment if the relief secured in the suit 
does not harm him.147 The instant provision reinforces the phi-
142 FINAL REPORT 75. 
143 1 HONIGllrAN &: HAWKINS 558. 
144 Ibid. 
145 MICH. RULE 205.2, quoted in the text at note 131 supra. 
146 1 HONIGMAN &: HAWKINS 558. 
147 See discussion of this viewpoint in Reed, supra note 132, at 532-37 (pt. 2). 
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losophy that the trial court should give whatever relief it can give 
without prejudice to the absent party.148 
On the other hand, a trial judge may err in rendering a judg-
ment on the law against plaintiff. If his decision is reversed on 
appeal and the case may not proceed without the absent party, 
there has also been a waste of time and effort.149 Furthermore, 
even though a judgment against plaintiff may have no legal effect 
on absent parties, it could have important extra-legal effects. It 
should also be noted that the rule is not clear in specifying the 
stage of the suit at which the judge may rule on the law against 
the plaintiff, within the terms of the rule, or whether his ruling 
can only be made on the face of the complaint.150 
Again, it seems desirable to postpone consideration of adop-
tion of this Michigan party rule until substantial experience is had 
with it in Michigan. 
C. Permissive ]oinder of Parties 
An innovation in the permissive joinder of parties rule alters 
the old saw, "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em." It seems to say, "If 
you can lick 'em, join 'em." In addition to the provision of Federal 
148 See Bourdieu v. Pacific W. Oil Co., 299 U.S. 65 (1936), in which the Court stated: 
"Since, plainly, the bill of complaint did not state a cause of action, the United States 
could have no interest in the case requiring its presence as a party; and the inquiry 
as to whether it was an indispensable party, which would have been entirely proper 
under a good bill, was here wholly gratuitous. 
"The rule is that if the merits of the cause may be determined without prejudice 
to the rights of necessary parties, absent and beyond the jurisdiction of the court, it 
will be done; and a court of equity will strain hard to reach that result .... If it be 
urged that the United States is an indispensable party and, hence, that the court may 
not proceed even to inquire whether the bill states a cause of action, the answer is 
that iood sense suggests precisely the contrary. For a mere inspection of the bill at 
once discloses that it states no cause of action and, therefore, the United States is not 
an indispensable party, since it cannot be prejudiced by, and has no interest reqttiring 
protection in, a proceeding which at the threshold is seen to be without substance. 
Nothing is to be gained by an inquiry into the status of absent parties when it is 
certain upon the face of complainant's bill that in no event will he be entitled to a 
decree in his favor." Id. at 70-71. 
140 As indicated in the quotation in note 148 supra, the Supreme Court emphasized 
that in the Bourdieu case it was certain that no cause of action was stated by com-
plainant's bill. In Smith v. Sperling, 237 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 
354 U.S. 91 (1957), the court of appeals ordered the trial court to determine the legal 
sufficiency of a cause of action asserted by plaintiff before proceeding to consider a non-
joinder objection under Federal Rule 19. The clarity of the objection to plaintiff's 
complaint was not mentioned. 
150 In Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 
U.S. 782 (1946), the majority opinion states that the rule of the Bourdieu case does not 
apply if the complaint states a cause of action. See discussion in Reed, supra note 132, 
at 530-37 (pt. 2). Michigan Rule 506 does not seem to be so restricted. 
1426 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
Rule 20 that parties may be joined if there is asserted by or against 
them any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series thereof, and if any question of 
law or fact common to them all will arise in the action, Michigan 
Rule 206 states that all persons may join as plaintiffs or be joined 
as defendants in one action "if it appears that their presence in 
the action will promote the convenient administration of jus-
tice."151 
When will the presence of parties "promote the convenient 
administration of justice"? A similar provision in a former Mich-
igan statute did not authorize plaintiffs to join unless their 
causes of action were joint and did not authorize plaintiffs to join 
defendants unless the liability was one asserted against all of 
them.152 It appears that if the instant clause of the rule has this 
meaning it adds nothing to Federal Rule 20(a). Therefore, it has 
been urged that the clause authorizes joinder although claims and 
parties may not be joined under Federal Rule 20(a).153 More spe-
cifically, it is suggested that plaintiff may join claims against one or 
more but not all of the defendants with a claim against all of mul-
tiple defendants when the former claims do not arise out of the same 
transaction or occurrence (or series of transactions or occurrences) 
which gave rise to the claim against all the multiple defendants.154 
There is some support for the view that the same result follows 
under Federal Rule 20(a).155 However, it is contrary to the major-
ity of federal court decisions on the subject.156 These cases take 
the viewpoint that all claims by or against multiple parties must 
relate to the same transaction or occurrence under Federal Rule 
20(a). 
It can be questioned whether the wholesale joinder of un-
related claims in multiple party suits is desirable. Even if such 
joinder is desirable in some instances, the circumstances under 
which joinder is generally authorized to promote the convenient 
administration of justice remains a mystery. The standard is so 
broad it may be largely ineffective. Or if it is made effective by 
151 MICH. RULE 206.1. 
152 1 HoNIGMAN & HAWKINS 578. 
153 Id. at 578-79. 
154 Id. at 579-80. 
155 See the argument in 2 BARRON & HoLTZOFF § 533.1, and in Wright, ]oinder of 
Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 MINN. L. REY. 580, 604-11 (1952). 
156 The applicable cases are cited and discussed in 2 BARRON & HoLTZOFF § 533,1. 
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the courts, the standard does not indicate the areas in which it 
will be effective. 
As it now stands, the instant provision appears undesirable as 
a model for a change in Federal Rule 20(a). 
V. DISCOVERY RULES 
For the most part, the new Michigan discovery rules follow 
the format and content of the federal discovery rules. Of the vari-
ous revisions which have been made, three are of primary im-
portance. 
A. Limitation of Discovery to Matter Which Is Relevant and 
Admissible Under the Rules of Evidence 
In its final report the joint committee recommended that the 
discovery rules in Michigan should have the same scope of opera-
tion as the federal rules.157 Under the federal rules, discovery may 
be had regarding any matter which is not privileged and which is 
relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.158 Testimony 
may be elicited, even if it is not admissible at the trial, if it appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence.159 
The prior Michigan rules had limited the taking of deposi-
tions and pre-trial discovery to "matter not privileged and ad-
missible under the rules of evidence governing trials, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involving the pending action."16 ()1 
In rejecting this limitation, the joint committee tersely stated~ 
"The admissibility and relevancy test of the present rules is 
eliminated, and the Federal Rules followed. What is admissible 
and relevant depends on factors that can be known only when 
the matter is offered in evidence at the trial, and not at this early 
stage of the proceedings."161 However, the recommendation of the 
joint committee was not followed. When the discovery rules were 
finally promulgated, they limited the taking of depositions by the 
above-mentioned language used in the former Michigan rule.162 
157 FINAL REPORT 84-85. 
158 F.ED. R. CIV. P. 26 (depositions), 33 (interrogatories), 34 (discovery and production 
of documents and things). 
150 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
100 Former Michigan Rule 35. 
101 FINAL REPORT 85. 
102 MICH. RULE 302.2(1). 
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Presumably the justification for an "admissibility" limitation 
relates to a fear that without the limitation discovery procedures 
can be mere "fishing expeditions."163 Is there anything of sub-
stance in this reason for the limitation if the federal discovery 
rules are otherwise adopted? 
In answering this question, consideration should be given to 
the reasons for the use of depositions and interrogatories for the 
purpose of discovery-a purpose which is specificially mentioned 
in the new Michigan rules.164 These reasons for discovery proce-
dures have been reviewed many times by judges and commentators. 
In summary, the discovery rules were devised to provide means 
for full disclosure of all facts for presentation at the trial, exposure 
of groundless claims, creation of a rational basis for settlement, 
and delimitation of the area of controversy. Discovery affords the 
opportunity to avoid surprise, confusion, and gamesmanship.165 
To accomplish these purposes fully, "fishing expeditions" for in-
admissible evidence are necessary if that epithet means a search 
for facts which are relevant but inadmissible. In Michigan it is 
not entirely true that it "is no longer a valid objection that coun-
sel's discovery proceedings may constitute a 'fishing expedition,' 
if there appears any reasonable possibility that there be fish in 
the pond."166 
Furthermore, the limitation is not necessary to protect a party 
against discovery of irrelevant matter. Court orders may be ob-
163 In rejecting a contention that an administrator of a decedent's estate could not 
take the deposition of a plaintiff without waiving the plaintiff's disqualification under 
the dead man's statute, the court made the following statement concerning the instant 
limitation, "It will be noted, however, that, at least so far as matters not privileged are 
concerned, the limitation pertains not to the identity, qualifications or competence of 
a witness but to the competency of the evidence and its relevance to the subject matter 
of the litigation. This limitation was intended to prevent fishing expeditions into areas 
unrelated to the cause of action, not to impede a party in discovering from any person, 
whether competent as a witness or not, all facts and information, not privileged, which 
are relevant to that cause of action." Banaszkiewicz v. Baun, 359 Mich. 109, 115-16, 101 
N.W.2d 306, 308-09 (1960). 
164 "After commencement of an action, any party may take the testimony of any 
person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interroga• 
tories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both 
purposes." MICH. RULE 302.1. 
165 Representative comments are contained in the following materials: Hickman v. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266 (1961); 2A BARRON &: HoLTZOFF § 641; 4 MooRE 1031-36; The 
Practical Operation of Federal Discovery (A Symposium on the Use of Depositions and 
Discovery Under the Federal Rules), 12 F.R.D. 131, 139 (1951); Developments in the 
Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. R.Ev. 940, 944-46 (1961). 
166 BELLI, MonERN TRIALS 29 (abridged ed. 1963). 
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tained to protect against annoyance, embarrassment or oppression 
under the federal and Michigan rules.167 As mentioned below, the 
Michigan rules also furnish adequate protection against unneces-
sary discovery of materials gathered for the suit and prohibit in-
vestigation of some of the work product of an attorney. 
One of the chief criticisms of the federal discovery rules is the 
charge that discovery often necessitates unreasonable expense. The 
instant limitation can have little effect upon expense. It should 
also be noted that the Michigan rule provides that the court may 
issue orders to protect a party against undue expense.168 
It has already been suggested that the complaint should be 
required to state a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief, as spe-
cified in Federal Rule 8. In states in which such a provision is 
in force, adoption of the instant limitation in the discovery rules 
would be particularly illogical because the discovery of the facts 
and the delimitation of the controversy by discovery are more im-
portant goals when relatively general complaints are possible. 
Thus, once the federal rules system is adopted, the addition 
of the instant limitation is neither very logical nor sensible. Of 
course, it cannot be denied that, even with this limitation, the 
Michigan discovery rules are useful. 
B. Work Product of Client and Attorney 
The Michigan rules also include express restrictions on dis-
covery of writings prepared in anticipation of litigation, statements 
secured from witnesses, and other "work product" of the client and 
his attorney. Rule 306.2 contains the following provisions: 
"The court shall not order the production or inspection of 
any writing prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, 
surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or 
in preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of produc-
tion or inspection will unfairly prejudice the party seeking 
the production or inspection in preparing his claim or defense 
or will cause him undue hardship or injustice. The court shall 
not order the production or inspection of any statement ob-
tained from an adverse party or other witness by a party, his 
attorney, surety, indemnitor or agent in anticipation of litiga-
tion unless a copy of such statement was not given to the wit-
107 FED. R. CIV. P. 30, 31, 33. 
10s MrcH. Ruu:s 306.2, 307.2, 309.2. 
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ness or party or unless the court is satisfied that the denial 
of production and inspection will unfairly prejudice the party 
seeking the production or inspection in preparing his claim 
or defense or will cause him undue hardship or injustice." 
Also, production or inspection of writings which reflect an at-
torney's mental impressions, conclusions, or legal theories cannot 
be ordered.169 
The first sentence quoted above from Rule 306.2 is somewhat 
similar to an amendment to the federal rules proposed in 1946. It 
is essentially a compromise between proposals that the described 
material be privileged and that the described material be subject 
to discovery without limitation.17° If a specific compromise be-
tween extreme viewpoints is to be adopted, it is a feasible alterna-
tive. However, as indicated in the discussion below, it should be 
expanded to include statements of witnesses. 
Although the rule is workable, very little guidance is furnished 
· by the language of the limitation. From this standpoint, it might 
well be desirable to indicate more clearly the factors which attor-
neys and judges should consider, or, on the other hand, to place 
greater emphasis on the discretion of the trial judge. 
A number of questions are raised by the separate treatment of 
statements of witnesses and parties in the second sentence quoted 
from Rule 306.2. It requires that, in addition to the matters which 
a court should consider in ordering production of writings under 
the first sentence quoted above, the matter of whether the ad-
verse party or other witness was given a copy of his statement 
should be a pertinent factor for consideration when production 
of witnesses' statements is sought. 
The consideration which a court should give to this matter 
is not clearly indicated. Ambiguous and awkward, the sentence 
suggests various interpretations. The following questions do not 
exhaust the possibilities. Does the sentence mean that production 
by an opponent of a statement of a witness who is not a party can 
be ordered only if the copy of the statement was not given to the 
169 MICH. RULE 306.2. 
170 Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amend-
ments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 
433, 457-60 (1946). See generally Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 165, 
at 1027-44. 
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witness and denial of production would prejudice the party seek-
ing production? Does it mean that the court may order production 
of a copy without more ado on the mere showing that the oppo-
nent did not originally give a copy to the witness? Does the sen-
tence mean that, even if the witness was given a copy of his state-
ment, the court may order production by the opponent who has 
a copy if the party seeking production would otherwise be pre-
judiced or harmed if he did not obtain a copy from anyone? Does 
it mean that the court may order production by the opponent only 
if the party seeking production would be prejudiced or harmed 
because he cannot presently obtain a copy from the witness who 
was originally given a copy by the opponent? 
Perhaps the most logical interpretation on the face of the 
language is the interpretation that a court may not ordinarily 
order production by the opponent if the witness has been given 
a copy of his statement, but, if for some reason the party demand-
ing the copy will be prejudiced by lack of production by the oppo-
nent (because the witness has lost his copy, etc.), the production 
can still be ordered. On the other hand, if the witness has not 
been given a copy of his statement, perhaps production of the 
opponent's copy may be ordered without any further showing. 
Perhaps a showing of prejudice might still be required if the wit-
ness has not been given a copy. The question of whether a witness 
has a copy of his statement demanded froin the opponent appears 
relatively unimportant in any event. The opponent has no sub-
stantive objection to producing a statement of a witness if he can 
only object that the witness has a copy. 
The Michigan rule would thus be much simplified if the first 
sentence quoted above included statements of witnesses as well as 
other writings, and if the second sentence were eliminated. 
C. Miscellaneous Provisions 
Upon permission of the court or stipulation of the parties, 
depositions may be electronically recorded.171 This provision per-
mits accumulation of experience with electronic devices. 
Various other minor additions are made to the federal rules. 
Some of these embody proposed amendments to the federal rules 
which have not been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United 
171 MICH. RULE 306.3. 
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States. Others amplify or clarify specific provisions m the federal 
rules.172 
VI. PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
Michigan Rule 30 I is similar to the former Michigan rule 
concerning mandatory pre-trial conferences. The matters which 
should be considered at such a conference are stated in much more 
detail than in the federal rule.173 In this respect, the Michigan rule 
is a substantial improvement over the federal rule, which specifies 
the subject matter of a conference in vague, general terms.174 It 
172 Some of these changes are treated in Comment, Pre-Trial Deposition and Dis-
covery Under the Michigan General Court Rules of 1963, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 417 (1962). 
173 "In every contested civil action the court shall direct the attorneys for the parties 
to appear before it for a conference to 
(1) state and simplify the factual and legal issues to be litigated, to consider the 
formal amendment of pleadings or their amendment by pretrial order, and if desirable 
or necessary, to order that such amendments be made; 
(2) hear and determine all pending defenses filed under Rule 110.16 and motions 
which should be disposed of before trial; and determine whether a jury trial shall be 
had pursuant to demand, if any, theretofore made; 
(3) consider the consolidation of cases for trial, the separation of issues, and the 
order of trial when some issues are to be tried by a jury and some by the court; 
(4) consider admissions of fact and authenticity of documents, including ordinances, 
charters, and regulations, which will avoid unnecessary proof; 
(5) consider limiting the number of expert witl'lesses and whether the parties wish 
to agree to the appointment of an impartial expert; 
(6) specify all damage claims in detail as of the date of the conference but the 
amount of liability insurance carried by a party shall not be required to be disclosed 
at the pretrial conference or by means of discovery unless it is relevant to an issue in 
the case and admissible in evidence; 
(7) produce all proposed exhibits in the possession of the attorneys in support of 
the main case or defense and admit the authenticity of such exhibits whenever possible; 
(8) arrange for completion of discovery proceedings, physical examinations, and 
depositions; 
(9) submit and consider appropriate authorities in support of contentions made; 
(10) estimate the time required for trial; 
(11) discuss the possibility of settlement; 
(12) consider all other matters that may aid in the disposition of the action." MICH. 
RULE 301.1. 
174 "In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties 
to appear before it for a conference to consider 
(1) The simplification of the issues; 
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; 
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid 
unnecessary proof; 
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses; 
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings to 
be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury; 
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action. 
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the 
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to 
any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed 
of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the 
1963] NEW MICHIGAN PROCEDURAL RULES 1433 
is particularly desirable for use in a state in which pre-trial con-
ferences have not been previously authorized. 
The nationwide controversy concerning the utility of a pre-
trial conference will not be recounted here. In any event, the 
experience in Michigan with mandatory conferences should be 
investigated in every jurisdiction in which provisions similar to 
the federal rules are effective. 
VII. TRIAL, JUDGMENT, AND POST-TRIAL RULES 
Whenever the federal rules which apply to procedures prior 
to trial are adopted, a few federal rules relating to trial and judg-
ment must also be adopted.175 All such rules have been adopted 
in Michigan. The remaining trial and post-trial rules are im-
portant, but space limitations preclude discussion of them here. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Judge Clark stated his reaction to new rule proposals of the 
Advisory Committee for the Temporary Commission on the New 
York Courts as follows: "One senses a conceived necessity to use 
much of the federal system while disguising this use so far as 
may be."176 He also concluded that the New York proposals (which 
have now been enacted) followed an outmoded pattern of "con-
fusing intermixtures of the federal practice denatured by local 
rules."177 
The Michigan rules that are effective prior to trial cannot be 
so characterized, because they contain federal rules provisions to 
a greater degree. And it is also true that the new Michigan rules 
and statutes constitute, for Michigan, the major and enlightened 
reform characterized in the quotation at the beginning of this 
article. Nevertheless, the above review of major changes in the 
federal rules indicates rather clearly that the Michigan rules do 
not embody as logical and coherent a system of procedure prior 
to trial as does the federal rules system without the Michigan 
changes. It seems inevitable that lack of complete consistency and 
subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injus-
tice." FED. R. Crv. P. 16. 
175 Fro. R. Cxv. P. 42 (Consolidation; Separate Trials), 54 (b) and (c) (Judgment Upon 
Multiple Claims; Demand for Judgment), 62(h) (Stay of Judgment Upon Multiple Claims). 
176 Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 CoLU.M. L. REv. 435, 448 (1958). 
177 Id. at 447-48. 
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unity will result from a hybrid system of procedure which is based 
essentially upon the federal rules system, with substantial changes 
motivated in part by a desire to retain some prior state practices 
not contained in the federal rules, and in part by a desire to im-
prove specific federal rules by innovations. 
The major changes which have been made in the federal rules 
in order to retain prior Michigan practice do not for the most 
part furnish desirable models for other states in which the federal 
rules system is employed or contemplated. Each major innovation 
must be judged on its merits. Some of the major innovations dis-
cussed here are not desirable models; some are at the least pres-
ently questionable. It is fair to conclude that, taken as a whole, 
the Michigan pre-trial procedural rules system is not as desirable 
for use in other states as the federal rules system without the 
Michigan changes. 
